# How to transform a tiny medical device into a secure one in easy steps

Geert-Jan Schrijen, Georgios Selimis, Vincent van der Leest

**IoT Security Foundation Conference 2019** 



Intrinsic ID's work in developing and deploying unique microchip fingerprint technology for new markets is supported by

#### NSTFT


A project funded under European Commission Project Grant Agreement ID: 811509



## Introduction



- Remote human body monitoring allows users to track their own conditions, eliminates need for repeated doctor visits and supports customized treatment plans
- High level architecture:
  - Sensor digitizes the input (e.g. heart rate, glucose level, blood pressure...) and pre-processes data
  - Data is transmitted to hub/gateway (e.g. smartphone) via local wireless connection such as Bluetooth Low Energy
  - Gateway forwards data to cloud service where Doctor can connect to, analyze the data, and communicate to the patient (e.g. via a smartphone app)



## Advantages of devices bring security concerns



Medical devices in the past		Medical devices today
Devices are connected physically		Devices are connected wirelessly to patients
Obtained data is stored on paper		Data is stored on cloud
Devices are physical products		Devices include HW, SW and health information
Care is administrated at a healthcare location		Care is available to patients through apps
Physical access is needed to view health data		Health data can be accesses anywhere
Security concerns		

Patients could be harmed


Protected health data could be lost

**Lost trust in connected devices** 

## We need a security subsystem that...



- Protects the device's identity, manages cryptographic keys
- Operates in a separate security domain (isolated from user code and apps)
- Is universal; can be rolled out onto a wide variety of MCUs including retrofitting existing devices
- Provides cryptographic services for
  - Device security
  - Device authentication
  - Secure communication







## Foundation: from nanoscale variations to keys






#### **Process Variation**

Deep sub-micron variations in the production process give every transistor slightly random electric properties



#### Silicon Fingerprint .....

The start-up values create a highly random and repeatable pattern that is unique to each chip



#### **SRAM Start-up Values**

When the SRAM is powered on this randomness is expressed in the start-up values (0 or 1) of SRAM cells



The silicon fingerprint is turned into a secret key that builds the foundation of a security subsystem

## **Device Security**




Valuable IP and Sensitive Data should be protected from...





Cloning




Over-Production

## Device Security: IP Protection Based on SRAM PUF




Anti-Reverse-Engineering/
Secure data storage

Firmware IP is encrypted with an SRAM PUF-derived encryption key that is locked to the hardware instance of the device.




#### **Anti-Cloning**

When the firmware IP tied to a device by SRAM PUF is copied to other device instances, these rogue devices cannot unlock the IP and use it, since they have different hardware fingerprints.



#### **Anti-Overbuilding**

The number of SRAM PUF enrollments in devices can be limited to protect against overbuilding.



## **Device Authentication**



Why is it important?



Medical
Data is
Sensitive &
Private



M2M, no Human User




Passwords can be Stolen or Forged

## Authentication with strong chip identity

OEM / CA




- Extract device-unique cryptographic root key from SRAM PUF using a Fuzzy Extractor
- Asymmetric identity key pair is derived from the PUF root key, via a key derivation function
- A trusted party (e.g. OEM or CA) creates an Identity Certificate for the device public key



## Secure Communication



- A typical device to cloud system consists of multiple sequential links with various connectivity mechanisms between device and cloud service
- Every connectivity mechanism uses its own link encryption




- End-to-end security is missing
  - Data can be intercepted, read and manipulated at the intermediate points
  - Recipient (doctor) cannot be assured that data is authentic
  - End-User privacy is not guaranteed




## End-to-End secure channel between Chip and Application





## Result: E2E Data Security





#### **End-to-end security**

- Data is passing through intermediate points encrypted
- Recipient (doctor) is assured that data is authentic
- End-User privacy is guaranteed



## Extra steps to secure an existing device





Threat
Analysis &
Security
Architecture

Leverage Chip Hardware





Secure Boot & Update







Disable Debugging

## Conclusions



- The security of medical IoT devices need to be addressed on multiple levels: device security, secure authentication, communication and data security
- Starting point of such an architecture is a strong device security subsystem rooted in the hardware of the device
- Physical Unclonable Technology provides a flexible secure, cost-efficient way to bootstrap such a security subsystem and setup a strong digital device identity

Intrinsic ID's work in developing and deploying unique microchip fingerprint technology for new markets is supported by

## INSTET

A project funded under European Commission Project Grant Agreement ID: 811509

